Defending Truth: Holocaust Denial in the Twenty-First Century (2024)

Genocide Denials and the Law

Ludovic Hennebel (ed.), Thomas Hochmann (ed.)

https://doi-org.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199738922.001.0001

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2011

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9780199895199

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9780199738922

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Genocide Denials and the Law

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Kenneth Lasson

Kenneth Lasson

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https://doi-org.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199738922.003.0005

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109–154

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    January 2011

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Lasson, Kenneth, 'Defending Truth: Holocaust Denial in the Twenty-First Century', in Ludovic Hennebel, and Thomas Hochmann (eds), Genocide Denials and the Law (2011; online edn, Oxford Academic, 1 May 2011), https://doi-org.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199738922.003.0005, accessed 3 June 2024.

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Abstract

This chapter is organized as follows. Part I describes the background and nature of Holocaust denial, tracing the Nazis' adoption of a plan for the “Final Solution of the Jewish Problem” through the postwar Nuremberg Trials to the present day. Part II examines the tension between free speech and historical revisionism, presenting various arguments in deference to principles of liberty and opposed to group defamation. Part III addresses the quest for truth in a free society.

Keywords: genocide denial, Nazis, Nuremberg Trials, free speech, historical revisionism

Subject

Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law Constitutional and Administrative Law Public International Law

Collection: Oxford Scholarship Online

The things i saw beggar description. I made the visit deliberately, in order to be in a position to give firsthand evidence of these things if ever, in the future, there develops a tendency to charge these allegations merely to propaganda.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower after liberating a Nazi concentration camp2

From the still-burning embers of the Holocaust, we have come once again to learn the terrible truth—that the power of evil still lurks among the nations of the world and cannot be underestimated. Nor can the effect of the spoken and written word, which in modern times must be taken in tandem with the violence of terrorism.

It has been but a half-century since the liberation of Nazi death camps, a little more than two decades since the First International Conference on the Holocaust and Human Rights,3 and a few short years since the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum first put on display its documentation of horror.4 Yet today, that form of historical revisionism popularly called “Holocaust denial” abounds worldwide in all its full-foul flourish—disseminated not only on Arab streets but in American university newspapers; not only in books, articles, and speeches but in mosques and over the Internet; and by heads of state.

“Israel must be wiped off the face of the map,” declared Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the elected president of Iran, in December of 2006. His primary justification—that the Jewish State’s existence is predicated upon events that never happened—is echoed throughout the Muslim world. Ahmadinejad’s true colors came through in a much ballyhooed international conference in Tehran, officially sponsored by the Iranian Foreign Ministry and billed as a “Review of the Holocaust: Global Vision.”5

In a global environment increasingly dominated by mass media of manifold form and format, we have also begun to understand that what is printed on paper or broadcast on television or bytten into cyberspace affects everyone, actually or subliminally. Conversely, what is rejected or otherwise left out is doomed to a world of communication failure, ignorance, and misunderstanding.

Although Holocaust denial—one of the twenty-first century’s fastest-growing forms of counterknowledge—is flourishing in the Arab world, many Western nations are wary of drawing attention to it for fear of upsetting Muslims.6

As the generation of survivors dwindles, whose words will win? Who decides what is to appear in the vast and burgeoning marketplace of ideas?

Many of these important choices are vested in editors and publishers, upon whom the United States Constitution confers almost unfettered discretionary authority. (Lesser but similar discretion is allowed in other Western democracies.) For the most part, journalists can write, say, depict, or ignore anything they want. Freedom of thought and expression is quintessentially American: one of our most hallowed liberties, limited only by circ*mstances where actual harm has been caused or is reasonably perceived as imminent. If a line can be drawn at all—between unfair suppression of thought on the one hand and good editorial judgment on the other—it is sometimes exceedingly faint, often entirely arbitrary, and always fundamentally subjective. The greater the opportunity for excess in the exercise of the power of the press is, the more profoundly difficult are the consequences in the protection of civil liberties for individuals.

That axiom has been brought into sharp focus by Holocaust deniers, whose goal is both facilitated and confused by the aura of “political correctness,” which nowadays surrounds a great deal of editorial decision making. Nowhere is this more pervasive than in academia. What should be the most receptive place for honest intellectual inquiry and discourse has instead become one where all assumptions are open to debate—even documented historical facts. This has had an unsettling effect on students (especially those editing university newspapers) who have long been subjected to the pressures of political correctness. When they become entangled in the black and nefarious thickets of Holocaust denial, their exercise of editorial discretion can be acutely conflicting psychologically and confounding intellectually.

So can the emotional pain suffered by victims of group libel. Remedies for that malady have not been clearly established in American law. Explored least of all is the effect upon a free society when the dissemination of demonstrably false ideas is constitutionally protected. Must writers and speakers who deny the Holocaust be guaranteed equal access to curricula and classrooms? Should the misrepresentation of historical fact be suppressed when it is motivated by nothing more than racial or ethnic animus? Should responsible libraries collect and classify work borne of blatant bigotry? Have survivors been injured when their victimization has been repudiated?

More profoundly, can we reject spurious revisionism or punish purposeful expressions of hatred and still pay homage to the liberty of thought ennobled by the First Amendment? Are some conflicts between freedom of expression and civility as insoluble as they are inevitable? Can history ever be proven as Truth?

This chapter attempts to answer these questions. Part I describes the background and nature of Holocaust denial, tracing the Nazis’ adoption of a plan for the “Final Solution of the Jewish Problem” through the postwar Nuremberg Trials to the present day. Part II examines the tension between free speech and historical revisionism, presenting various arguments in deference to principles of liberty and opposed to group defamation. Part III addresses the quest for truth in a free society.

1. Holocaust Denial

We will show you these concentration camps in motion pictures, just as the Allied armies found them when they arrived.…Our proof will be disgusting and you will say I have robbed you of your sleep.…I am one who received during this war most atrocity tales with suspicion and skepticism. But the proof here will be so overwhelming that I venture to predict not one word I have spoken will be denied.

Sen. Thomas Dodd (1947)7

Both Eisenhower8 and Dodd seriously understated the possibilities. In recent years, the contention that there was no mass extermination of Jews and no deaths in gas chambers at the hands of the Nazis has given rise to a pervasive (if predictable) revisionist industry. Holocaust denial books have made their way into academic and public libraries across the country and around the world, not to mention widespread dissemination over the Internet.

The Nazis themselves recognized that the sheer incredibility of what they had done would cast shadows of doubt upon any shocking eyewitness reports. Inmates at concentration camps testified that they were frequently taunted by their captors: “Even if some proof should remain and some of you survive, people will say that the events you describe are too monstrous to be believed; they will say that they are the exaggerations of Allied propaganda and will believe us, who will deny everything, and not you.”9

Indeed, early newspaper accounts of the death camps were obscured by dispatches about the war’s progress, if not questioned for their veracity.10 That is why Eisenhower, after the Nazis were conquered, ordered every American soldier not committed to the front lines to bear witness to places like Auschwitz, Belsen, and Buchenwald.11 “We are told that the American soldier does not know what he is fighting for,” he said. “Now, at least, he will know what he is fighting against.”12 This likewise explains why the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was so intent on documenting all of the atrocities found by the Allied liberators.

Without the past, without memory, without history, we are nothing—adrift. We place our destiny and dignity in the hands of the misfits and their projected psychoses. This movement is not an attack on the Holocaust but on the very notion of historical meaning. It is a revolt against reality, a threat not only to the past but to the future.13

1.1 The Nature of Denial

Holocaust deniers argue that the genocide of Jews and other minority groups during World War II either did not occur—that it was a deliberate Jewish hoax—or that it was a conspiracy to advance the interests of Zionism, or that it was greatly exaggerated. They maintain that the Nazi government never had a policy of deliberately targeting Jews, that many fewer than 6 million Jews lost their lives, and that there were no tools of mass extermination such as gas chambers or incinerators in the concentration camps.

Although such denial has been going on ever since the Holocaust occurred, as the years pass and the number of survivors diminishes, it has become more virulent. Many Holocaust deniers reject the term, describing themselves instead as “revisionists.” But deniers can be differentiated from revisionists, who consider their goal to be historical inquiry using evidence and established methodology.14

1.2 Denial in the Twenty-First Century

There is abundant evidence that Holocaust denial is a global and growing phenomenon.

According to the Wyman Institute for Holocaust Studies, denial activity has substantially increased worldwide, following a temporary lull in 2006, possibly caused by the imprisonment in Austria of the revisionists’ best-known figure, the British historian David Irving and the prosecution of the prominent activists Ernst Zundel and Gemar Rudolf in Germany.

Irving had been arrested while visiting Austria in November 2005 and prosecuted for speeches he had delivered in Austria in 1989. The appeals judge, Ernest Maurer, said the sentence should be reduced because the offending statements were made “a long time ago, 17 years,” and because the judge did not expect Irving would repeat the crime.15 But in January of 2007, Irving returned to the lecture circuit. He said in an interview on Italian television that Auschwitz “was a tourist attraction [which] did not have gas chambers.” Two months later, in Budapest, he was promoting the Hungarian-language edition of his new book, which alleges that the defendants at the Nuremberg Trials did not receive fair ones.16 In November, Irving spoke at the Oxford University Union debating society’s Free Speech Forum.17

Zundel was born in Germany and lived in Canada from 1958 until 2005, when he was deported because of his Holocaust denial activity. That activity included hosting radio and television shows, publishing books and pamphlets, and managing a Web site.18 In February of 2007, a German court sentenced Zundel to five years in jail; the country’s highest appeals court upheld the conviction.19

Rudolf went on trial in a Mannheim court for denying the Holocaust. Rudolf had written an article in 1991 claiming the Nazis did not gas Jews in Auschwitz and was sentenced to fourteen months in prison in 1995. He fled Germany to avoid jail and sought political asylum in the United States. That request was rejected, and Rudolf was sent back to Germany in November 2005 to serve his original sentence. During the trial’s opening session, Rudolf declared that the Holocaust was “a gigantic fraud.”20

Revisionists have also taken to late-night public-access television to assert that claims of Nazi genocide against the Jews during World War II are part of an elaborate hoax. Slickly produced videos purport to show that concentration camps like Auschwitz and Birkenau were recreational facilities, not death camps.21 Holocaust deniers claim that archival materials concerning Nazi atrocities—voluminously detailed lists of victims, miles of gruesome film footage, and vividly remembered accounts of eyewitnesses—have all been forged.22

Meanwhile, as use of the Internet has burgeoned, its millions of subscribers provide a vast new target audience for the efforts of numerous hate groups. Catering to white supremacists, antigovernment survivalists, militiamen, and would-be terrorists, Holocaust deniers have set up enough new sites on the World Wide Web to reach a larger potential constituency than any revolutionaries in history.23

In recent years, incidents of Holocaust denial have proliferated around the world. In Australia, an Islamic cleric named Sheik Taj Din al-Hilali called the Holocaust “a Zionist lie.” Mel Gibson and his father both support the Australian League of Rights, a group that denies the Holocaust. In Denmark, Al-Jazeera Television broadcast a meeting between Arab and Danish student groups, following the controversy over cartoons about Muhammad. During the meeting, Arab Students Union Chairman Ahmad Al-Shater referred to the Holocaust as “the imaginary Holocaust.” In France, George Theil, a 65-year-old former adviser to the extremist National Front Party, was convicted of denying the Holocaust for having said on French Television that the Nazi gas chambers were “a fantasy.” Robert Faurisson was convicted by a Paris court in October 2006 of Holocaust denial, after he said on Iranian Television that no gas chambers were used by the Germans to kill Jews.24

Holocaust denial in the United States is not a popular phenomenon, even though America remains the lone Western democracy to protect it as free speech. But it does occur. In January of 2006, Sheik Fadhel as Sahlani, the leader of a prominent mosque in Brooklyn, asserted that the Holocaust “has been exaggerated.” In April, Holocaust denier Larry Darby, a candidate for the Democratic nomination for attorney general of Alabama, was a featured speaker at a conference organized by the neo-Nazi National Vanguard in Elmwood Park, New Jersey. (The event included a performance by the neo-Nazi Holocaust-denying teenage singing duo “Prussian Blue.”) In June, Darby won 44 percent of the vote in the Alabama race. Darby claims the figure of 6 million Jews murdered by the Nazis was concocted by “the Holocaust industry,” insisting that no more than 140,000 Jews were killed and most of those by Typhus.25

The Institute for Historical Review (IHR) held its major event of the year at an unnamed restaurant meeting room in Arlington, Virginia, in July of 2006. IHR Director Mark Weber spoke about “the Jewish Zionist role in determining American foreign policy” and praised the recent study about the “Israel Lobby” by Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer. Paul Fromm, director of the extremist Canadian Association for Free Expression, focused on the imprisonment of David Irving in Austria and Zundel in Germany.26

The summer 2007 issue of IHR Update, published by the Institute for Historical Review, included an article by Daniel McGowan, which came to the defense of Zundel, Rudolf, and Faurisson and also claimed that “[t]he Holocaust narrative… has been an important tool to drive the United States into Iraq and now into Iran.”27

1.3 Denial in the Middle East

But all of these were relatively isolated incidents compared to what is happening in the Middle East. Holocaust denial has grown rapidly in Muslim countries, including American allies Egypt, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia—all of which receive significant U.S. economic and military aid. Members of the Syrian and Iranian governments, as well as Hizbollah and the Palestinian political group, Hamas, openly publish and promote such claims.28

In his 1982 doctoral dissertation, Mahmoud Abbas, a cofounder of Fatah and the current president of the Palestinian Authority, wrote: “It seems that the interest of the Zionist movement… is to inflate this figure [six million deaths] in order to gain the solidarity of international public opinion .… Many scholars have [determined] the number of Jewish victims at only a few hundred thousand.” That claim was repeated in Abbas’s 1983 book, The Secret Connection Between the Nazis and the Leaders of the Zionist Movement.29

As Israeli Cabinet Minister Isaac Herzog noted, Abbas’s view “is not a matter that can be brushed under the carpet, because at issue is a moral question whose importance cannot be overstated.”30

Islamic deniers appear to be inflamed by the attention given to Jewish victimization, which in their view has caused them to pay the price for Europe’s treatment of the Jews. They thus seek to delegitimize both Europe (pluralistic and tolerant, committed to human rights and human dignity) and Israel (which sees itself as the legacy of the Nazis’ victims and the antidote to another Holocaust). They also denigrate any country (especially the United States) where the Holocaust has come to occupy a prominent place in the moral discourse of the people.31 Abbas is well known for waffling in consideration of the current political situation; in a March 2006 interview with Ha’aretz, Abbas stated: “I have no desire to argue with the figures. The Holocaust was a terrible, unforgivable crime against the Jewish nation, a crime against humanity that cannot be accepted by humankind. The Holocaust was a terrible thing and nobody can claim I denied it.”32 But at a rally in Ramallah in early January of 2007, Abbas said: “The sons of Israel are mentioned [in the Quran] as those who are corrupting humanity on earth.”33

No such waffling from Ahmadinejad, who has become the world’s most visible denier. “As to the Holocaust,” he said in a Time Magazine interview, “I just raised a few questions. And I didn’t receive any answers to my questions. I said that during World War II around 60 million were killed. All were human beings and had their own dignities. Why only six million?” A fair question, perhaps, when taken out of the context in which it was uttered—that Israel is the cause of the world’s problems. Here are the official translations of some of Ahmadinejad’s other statements:

“The real cure for the conflict is elimination of the Zionist regime.” “The way to peace in the Middle East is the destruction of Israel.” “Like it or not, the Zionist regime is heading toward annihilation.”34

Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric was given its first showpiece at his Holocaust denial conference in Tehran in December of 2006. Officially sponsored by the Iranian Foreign Ministry and billed as a “Review of the Holocaust: Global Vision,” it was a well-orchestrated group polemic attended by delegates from thirty countries, including former Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke, French revisionists Robert Faurisson and Georges Thiel, and Australian denier Frederick Toben.35 In addition, several members of the extremist anti-Zionist Jewish sect Neturei Karta were prominently featured participants.36

All of the representatives were said simply to be “exercising their rights of free speech” in questioning the facts of World War II. In so doing, they were treated to an exhibit of photographs of dead Jews labeled “Myth” and “Typhus Victims” and of smiling Holocaust survivors under the heading of “Truth.”37 In addition, the conference enabled the Iranians to score propaganda points about Western hypocrisy—preaching free speech but disallowing “dangerous” views.38

In fact, many Holocaust revisionists claim their work falls under a “universal right to free speech” and seek to rely on Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees freedom of expression when faced with criminal sanctions against their statements or publications.39 But the European Court of Human Rights, for one, has consistently declared that such arguments are without merit. According to Article 17, nothing in the convention may be construed so as to justify acts that are aimed at destroying any of the very rights and freedoms contained therein. Invoking free speech to propagate denial of crimes against humanity is, according to the court, contrary to the spirit in which the convention was adopted. Reliance on free speech in such cases would thus constitute an abuse of a fundamental right.40

Iran also announced plans to establish an institution to conduct ongoing “research” concerning the Holocaust. Additional support is likely by virtue of the creation of the new English-language division of the Qatari government-funded Al Jazeera television network, which broadcasts remarks by Holocaust deniers.41

In an address at Columbia University in September of 2007, Ahmadinejad asked:

[W]hy is there not sufficient research that can approach the topic from different perspectives? There are researchers who want to push the topic from a different perspective. Why are they put into prison?… My question is, why isn’t it open to all forms of research?… Why don’t we encourage more research on a historical event that has become the root, the cause of many heavy catastrophes in the region in this time and age?… If it is a reality, we need to still question whether the Palestinian people should be paying for it or not.…42

In October of 2007, Ahmadinejad made the following assertions on Iranian television:

The leaders of several Western superpowers comprise the Zionist party. They are the ones who pull the strings. They created something called Zionism, and invented the so-called “oppression” of the Jews. They themselves created the background for this, and today as well, it is they who are running the show.… After World War II, they invented the so-called “genocide of the Jews.”… By means of propaganda and a certain psychological atmosphere, and by using the issue of the so-called “crematoria,” they created the sense that the European Jews were oppressed. They used the pretext that some Jews were oppressed and were harmed during World War II and by the wave of anti-Judaism in order to lay the foundations for the establishment of the Zionist regime.43

In September of 2009, prior to his appearance at the opening of the 64th General Assembly of the United Nations, Ahmadinejad once again stoked the fires by repeating his belief that the Holocaust was a myth. He questioned whether the Holocaust was “a real event,” calling it instead a pretext used by Jews to trick the West into backing the creation of Israel. The Jewish state, he said, was created out of “a lie and a mythical claim.”44 He appeared to relish the controversy. Asked about widespread condemnation of such remarks, he replied, “The anger of the world’s professional killers is (a source of) pride for us.”45

Shortly thereafter, Israel’s Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, responded with his own speech before the UN Holding aloft a copy of Hitler’s plan for a “Final Solution” to the Jewish problem—the detailed minutes of the infamous Wannsee Conference on January 20, 1942, in which the Nazis issued precise instructions on how to carry out the extermination of the Jews—he asked, “Is this a lie?” With the original construction blueprints for the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp in his hand, he asked, “Is this too a lie?” Netanyahu recalled the agreement within the UN to create the Jewish state and expressed astonishment at what he had witnessed a day earlier in that organization’s great hall. He commended those who boycotted Ahmadinejad’s speech but condemned those who allowed it, scolding the UN for giving the Iranian president “legitimacy” just six decades after the Nazi scourge. “To those who gave this Holocaust denier a hearing, I say on behalf of my people: Have you no shame? Have you no decency? What a disgrace,” Netanyahu said. “What a mockery of the charter of the United Nations.”46

Meanwhile, back in Israel, denial has become part of the Palestinian landscape. A public opinion poll conducted by Haifa University in March of 2007 found that 28 percent of Israeli Arab citizens “say they do not believe the Nazi genocide took place.” Among younger Israeli Arabs, the percentage was higher: 33 percent of Israeli Arabs of school age deny the Holocaust.47

Later that year, the Arab Institute for Holocaust Research and Education, a museum in Nazareth that teaches Israeli Arabs about the Holocaust, compared Israel’s policies to those of the Nazis. According to the Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA), the museum “juxtaposes the Holocaust with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by placing pictures of Nazis threatening or killing Jews next to pictures of Palestinian refugees, Palestinian victims of violence and the Palestinian flag.” The JTA quoted several teenage Israeli-Arab visitors to the museum as saying, “[t]he Jews are doing the same that was done to them.”48

Such perceptions, as one might suspect, are nurtured by Palestinian leadership. A new series of Palestinian Authority schoolbooks describe a World War II without the Holocaust. Instead, they teach about the “race theory” of the Nazi movement and even mention the trials of Nazi war criminals at the end of the war, but they don’t teach why they were on trial. The Palestinian Authority’s official radio station, Voice of Palestine, aired a quiz that depicted the life of Adolf Hitler in a favorable light and omitted any mention of the Holocaust.49

In the countries bordering Israel, denial is no less visible. For instance, in October of 2007, Lebanese television aired a program on drug abuse that included this statement:

Drugs were the Jews’ method of wearing down the German people, which led to the Nazi extremism, in which the Jews themselves played a role. In addition, they carried out widespread drug dealing in Czarist Russia, from the 17th century. This was in accordance with the Jewish Talmud, which says that the Jews must devote their greatest efforts to prevent other nations from ruling the land, so that the rule would be in the hands of the Jews alone.50

1.4 Confronting Denial

In January of 2007, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution (to coincide with International Holocaust Commemoration Day) condemning Holocaust denial. The resolution—passed by general consensus, with only Iran explicitly dissenting—called on all 192 UN member states to “unreservedly reject any denial of the Holocaust as a historical event, either in full or in part, or any activities to this end.”51 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressed “his strong desire to see this fundamental principle respected both in rhetoric and in practice.”52 In October, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) passed a resolution urging efforts to promote Holocaust education and combat Holocaust denial. Seventy-two UNESCO member states cosponsored the resolution. Egypt and other Arab states, and also Iran, attempted to change the wording of the resolution but were unsuccessful.53

There were also several hopeful developments: two prominent Muslims, the former prime minister of Indonesia and the president of the Islamic Society of North America, both condemned Holocaust denial; the United Nations General Assembly and UNESCO both passed resolutions opposing Holocaust denial; and the European Union urged all its member states to adopt legislation prohibiting Holocaust denial.

1.5 The Academic Voice

The gradual ascension of Holocaust revisionism into academic respectability is perhaps shocking only to those unfamiliar with the excesses of modern scholarship.54 Group defamation in the academic voice persists to this day, most notoriously in the form of the infamous “blood libels,” which claim that Jews kill Christian children for ritual purposes. Such myths are occasionally aided and abetted by “historical” accounts (not one of which has ever been buttressed by facts).55

Over time, in high schools and colleges across the United States, a number of teachers have come to tell their students that the Holocaust was a myth, while professors write “scholarly” articles, and school newspapers print denial advertisem*nt/essays saying the same thing.56 By 1995, the Anti-Defamation League had reported numerous incidents on American campuses concerning Holocaust denial.57

In recent years, one of the difficult decisions facing college or university newspapers has involved the controversial question of whether to publish a paid advertisem*nt denying the existence of the Holocaust.58 Most of these advertisem*nts are promulgated and paid for by the Committee for Open Debate on the Holocaust, which claims to “encourage scholarly discussion about the Holocaust.”59 In the 1980s, this committee began to place small notices in college newspapers with its address and telephone number. By the 1990s, these paid advertisem*nts had become long essays, written in the academic voice, arguing that Holocaust statistics were vastly overstated and that allegations of Nazi gas chambers were frauds aided by doctored photographs.60

A private college or university newspaper is not a state actor (and therefore not protected by First Amendment guarantees), but is subject to the scrutiny of school administrators and bound by school policies. Although most colleges and universities adopt policies that are compatible with expressing and testing new ideas, they retain the power to impose prior restraints that could prohibit publication of certain material based on its content.

The primary issue to be determined in cases involving a state-supported college or university newspaper is whether school administrators are involved in the editorial decisions of the student paper. Where the newspaper is free from the control of the administration, its actions are viewed as being independent of the state and not subject to constitutional scrutiny. It follows in such cases that there has been no state action where an author of proffered material is denied access to the paper based on the material’s content.

In short, the campus newspaper of a state-supported university is entitled to the First Amendment’s freedom of the press protection—including the freedom to exercise subjective editorial discretion by rejecting a proffered article, editorial, or advertisem*nt.61 Thus, editors of a state college or university newspaper have a right to editorial discretion, and school administrators do not.

1.6 Books

Many of the Holocaust denial books are published by the so-called Institute for Historical Review, a once-obscure revisionist think tank which also produces a glossy periodical called the Journal of Historical Review.62 The institute was founded by a notorious anti-Semite, Willis Carto,63 and for years operated out of Newport Beach, California, and was headed by a nonacademic named Bradley Smith.64 Among its most popular tracts are The Hoax of the Twentieth Century 65 by Northwestern University Professor Arthur Butz and Debunking the Genocide Myth 66 by Paul Rassinier. Both present the now-familiar argument that reports of the systematic killing of Jews in Nazi concentration camps were myths propagated by Zionists in an effort to create support for a Jewish State in Palestine.67

1.7 Holocaust Denial and Political Correctness

Political correctness may be on the run in the pop culture of talk radio, but it is no laughing matter in the Ivory Tower. Though scarcely reported by the media, hundreds of American colleges and universities—from the backwoods of Appalachia to the august quadrangles of Ivy League law schools—are currently engaged in an entrenched battle over both the nature of the standard curriculum and the freedom of speech on campus.68

Fifty years ago, when the Holocaust was still a new and searing cataclysmic event, the bramble bush of political correctness was mere stubble in the wasteland of academic politics. Now, universities are pushing various political correctness agendas by way of curricular reform and the promulgation of speech and conduct codes. Orthodoxies of all kinds are being challenged. Eurocentric doctrine (including that of modern Jewish history) is subjected to “deconstruction,” with the underlying theory that all opinions are valid. Facts are said to be nothing more than received opinions. This phenomenon has enabled Holocaust deniers to elevate their cause into the realm of academic debate.

Thus, when American adults were asked in 1993 if they thought it possible that the Holocaust never really ever happened, 20 percent of them answered in the affirmative.69 Almost fifteen years later, a Haifa University survey found that more than a quarter of Israel’s Arab citizens believed the Holocaust never happened; the percentage rose to a third for college and high school graduates.70

Such a response is not the concern of constitutional scholars, whose abiding interest in political correctness has always been the stifling effect on civil liberties and academic freedom of the restrictive speech and conduct codes that have become commonplace in the Ivory Tower.71 Even though not one such code has been able to withstand constitutional scrutiny, both students and professors (as well as administrators) look and listen nervously over their shoulders for fear of offending mushrooming numbers of special interest groups.72

What the Founding Fathers envisioned as vigorous disagreement in a free and open marketplace of ideas—even if some of those thoughts are abhorrent to the civil temperament—has been quashed at the very places that such debates are supposed to occur most freely.73 What should be one of the richest and most receptive places of honest intellectual inquiry and discourse has instead become one of the most intolerant. The university has become a decidedly unwelcome nesting place for people with traditional points of view or ways of presenting them. What were once noble and defensible goals—intellectual curiosity and sensitivity toward others—have been forged into bludgeons of moral imperatives.74

In an academic environment charged with political correctness, the choice of campus speakers appears to be highly subjective. In the 1990s, noted figures who have uttered anti-Semitic words—Louis Farrakhan,75 Tony Martin,76 Khalid Abdul Muhammad,77 and Leonard Jeffries78—were regularly invited by student groups to appear on protected campus venues. When challenged, the sponsors often claim that they and their guests are exercising their First Amendment rights, the same argument that was used to justify the Holocaust denial conference in Iran in 2006.79

The pervasive atmosphere of the political correctness current in the university today complicates the question of Holocaust revisionism. In seeking to challenge traditional culture, the guardians of political correctness have been tellingly inconsistent. While they would be quick to condemn a historian who denied the evils of slavery, they have been reluctant to spurn Holocaust denial. Perhaps this is because their agenda is essentially anti-Western, anti-white, and anti-imperialist; Jews are not viewed as an endangered minority; Zionism is seen not as a liberation movement but as racism.80

Pressure to be politically correct has generated a backlash against political correctness as well. The combination of the two has had an unsettling effect on student editors. Can those who would voice alarm at the modern political correctness movement’s exclusion of Eurocentric culture at the same time call for exclusion of revisionists and deniers? Students might find it difficult to condemn both the excesses of political correctness and the promulgation of Holocaust denial literature. Here, after all, is where two principles—the freedom of speech in the quest for truth and the suppression of racism in the quest for equality—are sometimes in conflict.

2. Historical Aspects of Free Expression: Framers and Revisionists

If by the liberty of the press, we understand merely the liberty of discussing the propriety of public measures and political opinions, let us have as much of it as you please; but, if it means the liberty of affronting, calumniating, and defaming one another, I own myself willing to part with my share of it whenever our legislators shall please to alter the law; and shall cheerfully consent to exchange my liberty of abusing others for the privilege of not being abused myself.

Benjamin Franklin81

2.1 Principles of Liberty

Franklin’s view may have been civil and proper, but the Founding Fathers were motivated by a much more libertarian philosophy when they drafted the Bill of Rights.82 The First Amendment not only protects the media from government interference but grants the press almost absolute power to print whatever it wishes.83 Freedom of the press, often characterized as “the mother of all our liberties,”84 had “little or nothing to do with truth-telling… Most of the early newspapers were partisan sheets devoted to attacks on political opponents.…” Back then, freedom of the press meant “the right to be just or unjust, partisan or non-partisan, true or false, in news column or editorial column.”85 That same freedom also allows newspapers to reject any matter, editorial or advertising.

Constitutional interpretation often begins with speculation about the intent of the Founding Fathers.86 As to the First Amendment, much has been made of Thomas Jefferson’s libertarian perspective on free speech: the best way to deal with error is to permit its correction by truth.87 “The bar of public reason,”88 said Jefferson, “will generally provide the remedy for abuses occasioned by the unfettered dissemination of information. Only when security and peace are threatened should the discussion of political, economic, and social affairs be restrained.”89 James Madison, often called the architect of the Bill of Rights, thought likewise: freedom of speech and press, he wrote in The Federalist, would engender a reasoned citizenry that would, in turn, keep the government in check.90

It can also be argued that the Framers would not have wanted to protect racial defamation, which deliberately exacerbates group tensions and plays negatively upon the heterogeneous, pluralistic character of American society.91 The goal of casting contempt on an ethnic group is not to participate in political debate founded on the principle of pluralism but to destroy it. In this sense, racial defamation is subversive speech. Unlike political extremism in which (however distorted its form) the Framers’ principle of self-government is evident, the principle underlying racial defamation is pure-form discrimination.92

Other historians, however, conclude that there was no clear “intent” underlying the First Amendment.93 Rather, the Framers perceived issues of individual rights as concerns to be addressed not by the newly established general government but by the respective states. In fact, not all freedoms were easily recognized by the drafters of the Constitution. On the final day of the Constitutional Convention, for example, a provision that “the liberty of the Press should inviolably be observed” was proposed but was promptly voted down because (said the delegates), “it is unnecessary—the power of Congress does not extend to the Press.”94 Eventually, say some historians, the Bill of Rights was adopted less as an additional guarantor of liberty95 than as a bargaining chip to procure state ratification.96

Thus, one should not expect that understanding the intent of the Framers will resolve the question of precisely what they sought to protect by the First Amendment. There appears to have been no extensive carefully considered debate on the subject of individual freedom.

For some constitutional scholars, the principle of self-government sufficiently identifies the parameters of the First Amendment: Congress is forbidden from abridging the freedom of a citizen’s speech whenever it has anything to do with political, economic, and social issues.97 Put more succinctly, the Founding Fathers envisioned “the free and robust exchange of ideas and political debate.”98 The federal-state system of checks and balances was devised to prevent government tyranny.99 Similarly, the various guarantees of the Bill of Rights effectively prevent a “tyranny of opinion” from being concentrated in any one institution or person and serve to ensure social, political, and religious pluralism; it should be virtually impossible for popular self-government to be defeated by consolidation of control.100 The Framers may have perceived government to be a necessary evil,101 but it is probably more accurate to suggest that they drafted the Constitution to make the cooperation of competing interests the price for protecting the liberty of each. The guarantee of free speech enabled the citizens to express their will to a representative government.102 Thus, the narrowest historical interpretation of the free speech clause would limit its protection to the expression of purely political ideas.103 The broadest interpretation would allow for an absolutist intent on the part of the Framers. The Supreme Court, however, has adopted neither extreme. Instead, it has identified political speech as merely the central value to be protected. Such an evaluation logically requires a consideration of content: that is, what the speaker wants to say.104

The Founding Fathers’ debate on the First Amendment was brief, for they recognized that the rights of free expression were inherent and belonged to the people.105 “There are rights,” wrote Thomas Jefferson in March of 1789, “which it is useless to surrender to the government, and which yet, governments have always been fond to invade. These are the rights of thinking and publishing our thoughts by speaking or writing; the right of free commerce; the right of personal freedom.”106

Nevertheless, Jefferson’s conception of the inalienable rights of speech and press was not absolute. In his draft constitution for Virginia, he had proposed freedom of the press “except so far as by commission of private injury cause may be given of private action.”107 In a letter to James Madison in August of 1789, Jefferson proposed to qualify what would become the First Amendment as follows: “The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak or to write or otherwise to publish any thing but false facts affecting injuriously the life, liberty, property, or reputation of others.…”108 In short, interpreting the First Amendment to mean that suppression of ideas is not a legitimate governmental purpose is but one of several readings equally well rooted in language and history.109

2.2 The Right of Access

Regardless (or because) of interpretations of the Framers’ intent, clear law has evolved around the right of access to newspapers, limitations on government interference with them, and the characterization of public forums. While for the most part individuals may be guaranteed freedom from government regulation of their privately owned presses, citizens have never had the right of access to someone else’s printed pages. The Constitution does not grant a print forum to those without the wherewithal to start up their own newspapers, nor has Congress.110

Is there any difference between the First Amendment rights afforded a privately owned commercial newspaper and one sponsored by a private college or university? Is a public college or university newspaper any less protected by the Constitution?

Since newspapers have limited publishing space (and funds), editors must use their subjective judgment on a regular basis to determine exactly what will be published and what will not. A paper may refuse to print certain editorial material because of its content or due to lack of space or—in the case of advertising—out of financial considerations. While rejection based on space or financial considerations does not constitute an infringement on free speech, a content-based rejection may. The constitutionality of editorial discretion depends on the status of the publication—that is, whether it is an instrumentality of the state (in the language of the law, a “state actor”) or is privately owned, funded, and operated.111

Editors always make choices about what to publish, nurturing a bond of trust between them and their readers. That trust is violated if they knowingly disseminate historical lies like Holocaust denial advertisem*nts. With the power to publish comes the responsibility to seek truth, as well as to avoid defamatory propaganda.112

The Supreme Court has held that a private newspaper had a constitutional right to determine whether or not to publish a specific article, editorial, or advertisem*nt. In Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, the Court rejected a Florida statute requiring newspapers to publish replies to political editorials. Its decision was based upon the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of the press and freedom of speech; “the clear implication [of precedent] has been that any… compulsion to publish that which ‘reason’ tells editors should not be published is unconstitutional.”113

In essence, the Court held that editorial discretion under the First Amendment is almost absolute. Newspapers have a right to publish or refuse to publish whatever they choose: articles, editorials, or advertisem*nts. Even if the newspaper is the only one in town, or the biggest, or the most widely read, it can still print or reject practically anything. That an individual or group has the wherewithal to pay for an advertisem*nt does not guarantee access to a newspaper owned or operated by others. It can even discriminate against a particular advertiser if it so desires. In the absence of fraud or monopoly,114 “it is immaterial whether such [discrimination] is based upon reason or is the result of mere caprice, prejudice or malice. It is a part of the liberty of action which the Constitutions, State and Federal, guarantee to the citizen.”115

Prior restraints are seldom countenanced under the Constitution116—the rare exceptions relate to the publication of editorial matter advocating acts likely to incite imminent lawless action117 or disclosing state secrets118—but newspapers may be punished after the fact for publishing libelous119 or obscene120 material. Thus, private commercial newspapers may be prohibited from publishing information deemed damaging to national security121 and exhortations to violence or civil disobedience122 and punished for publishing defamatory stories123 and material considered obscene.124

While some limitations are imposed on publications, generally privately owned and operated newspapers have virtually unfettered discretion about what to publish and what not to publish. Just as editors are free to print almost anything, so can they decide what to reject. While the public might have a moral claim to have opinions expressed on editorial pages, it has no constitutional right of access to them.

2.3 Arguments in Deference to Freedom of Expression

The traditional justification for viewing the First Amendment’s guarantee of free expression as virtually absolute—the exceptions are few and narrow in scope—is to encourage an open and unfettered exchange of ideas.125 Thoughts that are abhorrent to a free society, the argument goes, will wither when aired but fester if suppressed.126 Moreover, who is to decide which ideas are abhorrent? Certainly not the government, reasoned the Constitution’s Framers. Free speech is so precious and delicate a liberty, it must be preserved at great cost.127 Thus, the depth of conviction in Voltaire’s oft-quoted declaration: “I disapprove of what you say but I will defend to the death your right to say it.”128

The interest that the First Amendment guards and gives it its importance, said Judge Learned Hand, presupposes that there are no orthodoxies—religious, political, economic, or scientific—that are immune from debate.129 Others have pointed to the First Amendment’s goal of ascertaining the truth—“[t]hrough the acquisition of new knowledge, the toleration of new ideas, the testing of opinion in open competition, the discipline of rethinking its assumptions, a society will be better able to reach common decisions that will meet the needs and aspirations of its members.”130

A more current statement of jurisprudential philosophy justifying traditional First Amendment principle, particularly the notion that American concepts of tolerance are noble and defensible, was voiced by Lee Bollinger in his oft-cited 1986 book entitled The Tolerant Society.131 Extolling the virtue of magnanimity and the First Amendment’s function in developing a capacity for tolerance, Bollinger claims that the toleration of verbal acts inculcates a “tolerance ethic,” which he describes as “a general disposition of being able to put aside our beliefs, of overcoming the instinct to have things our own way, to control, to dominate. It is to live in a world of difference, and to do so comfortably.” In essence, he says, “tolerance is to democracy what courage is to war.”132

Among the most frequently cited arguments in favor of protecting offensive expression are to preserve legitimate scientific and scholarly inquiry, to document bigotry in all its forms, and to avoid the dangers of line drawing that censorship and criminalization often encumber. Both legitimate scientific method and traditional scholarly inquiry demand that all evidence be recognized, investigated, and analyzed before conclusions can be drawn. This standard applies not only to orthodox views but to unpopular (even offensive) ones as well.133

In a true democracy, the government may not dictate what is right or wrong, true or false. No matter how obvious the distinctions may appear to be between historical fact and racist theory—a differentiation perhaps best illustrated by Holocaust denial—only the people can reject the expression of any thought, whether spoken or written; and even then, only as a matter of individual choice.134

It follows that we should educate our children to tolerate the diverse views of a pluralistic society. Just as we countenance others who advocate different ways of looking at the world, even as we may disagree with them, our textbooks should reflect the existence (if not the soundness) of denial theories. Thus, if public schools teach the Holocaust as a historical event, they must also teach that it may not have happened; if parents object to what they consider a historical fabrication, their children should be excused from class; if a state university funds speakers, it must tolerate deniers. Just as Holocaust denial may be seen as a threat to the ultimate power of reason, belief in the ultimate power of reason requires recognition of denial theories.135

If reason is to prevail, the existence of racism in all its manifestations must be documented. This is true of both fact and fiction. If we are to learn from history, what is the difference between the Nazis’ foul deeds and their descendants’ denial of them? It is as important for later generations to witness the propaganda of genocide as to see its effects, to hear the statements of racism as well as to countenance its results. Why should we even seek to suppress Holocaust denial when we have the benefit of the Nazis’ own diabolically meticulous record keeping as hard-core evidence of evil: the millions of personal effects they confiscated and itemized; the identification numbers branded into their victims’ arms as if they were animals; the logs of scientific experiments in torture; and ultimately, the precise tallies of lives snuffed out? Both the propaganda and the facts reflect the personification of brutality. To expurgate either would blur the facts of history and blot out the memory of all those martyred because of their ethnicity and murdered because of their race.

Few Americans want the government to decide for them what they can hear on the street corner, read in the library, or see in the cinema. It is not difficult to find abuses in the name of fair play, especially in countries that (unlike the United States) permit censorship and criminalization of that which the government finds to be hate speech.136

Criminalization illustrates the difficulties of line drawing. For example, in 1995, the distinguished historian Bernard Lewis was found guilty by a French court for expressing doubts that the massacre of 1.5 million Armenians early in this century by the Ottoman Empire could be correctly termed “genocide.”137 In Germany, a 1985 law facilitated the legal proceedings against those who deny the Holocaust “or another violent and arbitrary dominance.”138 This clause became quite contentious, the resulting controversy centering around the issues of restricting historical facts, promoting national consciousness, attributing collective guilt, and identifying the role of courts in punishing lies. Should denial of other known events, for example, the violent expulsion of Germans from Soviet-occupied East Germany, or the annihilation of millions of Cambodians by Pol Pot, or the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, be equally punishable? In other words, was the Holocaust a unique phenomenon?139

If Auschwitz is unique, the argument goes, then the phrase in the German statute, “or another violent and arbitrary dominance,” should have been eliminated; this addition renders the Holocaust unjustifiably relative and offends both the memory of those murdered and the sensibilities of survivors.140

In addition, experience with earlier legislation shows that hate-speech defendants, almost without exception, remain convinced, if not strengthened, in the truth of their contentions. Not only is deterrence unlikely, there is a real danger of backlash. The lie may be forbidden, but the liars remain. The judicial process cannot carry the burden of education that should fall to family, school, and political discourse. To the contrary, the German courts have become forums for neo-Nazi propaganda.141

Moreover, the task of drawing a line between “good” and “bad” is exceedingly difficult. Every year in the United States, all kinds of books are banned by public libraries—from Thomas Paine’s The Age of Reason and John Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath to Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of the Species and Hergé’s Tintin in the Congo.142 In recent years, the growing influence of the religious Right has been reflected in challenges to books about the occult, hom*osexuals, and racial minorities.143

In Canada, customs officials issue a list of imported materials that are reviewed for their potential to stir up racial hatred. Of the ninety titles on a recent list, only four were banned, including the standard anti-Semitic text, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion; Henry Ford’s The International Jew: The World’s Foremost Problem; and Arthur Butz’s The Hoax of the Twentieth Century. Those that were not banned included Neal Gabler’s An Empire of Their Own: How Jews Invented Hollywood and a compact disk entitled Aryan Outlaws in a Zionist Police State.144 There is little evidence that banning hate speech and literature serves to inhibit it. On the other hand, line drawing has proven virtually impossible.145

2.4 Arguments in Favor of Regulating Hate Speech

A persistent American shibboleth is that the First Amendment is virtually absolute: the Constitution guarantees everyone the freedom of self-expression, and anything that restricts this right is a step on the road toward tyranny. In the vernacular, “It’s a free country and I can say whatever I want.”146

That it is difficult to draw a line between acceptable and nonacceptable expression and hard to allocate responsibility for deciding what speech should be restricted, is too facile a rationale to justify a rule of absolute construction. The carefully drawn exceptions to the rule of free speech are based on logical demonstrations that there are certain utterances that must be limited even (if not especially) in a democratic society.147

The very existence of the doctrines in exception—“fighting words,” “clear and present danger,” “captive audience,” “legitimate time, place, and manner restrictions”148—belies the simplistic popular understanding of free speech.149 Such contextual limitations are joined by those which regulate content like obscenity and p*rnography,150 matters of national security,151 and threats against the president.152 It is unarguable that there should be absolute freedom to think what one wants; it does not follow—either legally, logically, or philosophically—that one may openly express whatever one thinks, whenever and wherever one desires.153 A majority of civil libertarians continue to advocate the First Amendment ideology that no orthodoxies should be immune from debate and dispute, but a growing number of constitutional scholars have begun to argue that that view should be “bemoaned and resisted rather than accepted or celebrated.”154

Those in favor of regulating hate speech are often held to a higher standard (if not regarded in lower esteem) by First Amendment purists. For example, historian Leonard Levy’s sponsors refused to publish his conclusion that (contrary to his earlier beliefs), the Framers of the Constitution had a far narrower conception of free speech and press.155 Other arguments in support of regulating hate speech are often stigmatized by the widely accepted ideology that urges courts to offer even greater protections of free speech.156

Even Professor Bollinger concedes that “tolerance has its limits” and that different societies must of necessity treat hate speech differently.157 The slippery slope theory, so often invoked by civil libertarians—dubbed by one doubter as “trickle-down chilling”—has not materialized in any other Western democracy. Yet all Western democracies but the United States have laws prohibiting the dissemination of hate speech.158

Traditional libertarians also argue that if one government can officially stipulate that the Holocaust occurred, then another government somewhere, sometime, can declare that it did not occur. Others say, “the grander the truth, the bigger the lie.”159 But such arguments are rendered speculative and facile, and ultimately meritless, when placed in the real-life context of what happens elsewhere.

A number of legal scholars have asserted that the harm of hate speech matters. Whatever form such speech takes, its purpose and effect are to deny the humanity of a group of people, making them objects of ridicule and humiliation so that acts of aggression against them, no matter how violent, are taken less seriously.160 Meanwhile, the targets of such behavior often respond to it with fear and withdrawal; the more they are silenced, the deeper their inequality becomes; many suffer post-traumatic stress disorders of varying degrees.161

Hate speech may be analyzed as the first stage in a continuum of increasing violence and intimidation, followed by avoidance, discrimination, attack, and extermination. As illustrated by the history of the Third Reich, each stage is dependent upon the preceding one: it was Hitler’s vocal anti-Semitism that led Germans to avoid their Jewish neighbors and friends; which, in turn, enabled easier enactment of the blatantly discriminatory Nuremberg laws; which, in turn, made synagogue desecration and street mugging more acceptable; which, in turn, allowed for creation of the killing fields in the death camps.162

The capacity of speech to cause injury in diverse ways is often viewed as a price that must be paid to ensure a truly free and democratic society. But even free societies must allocate the cost of injuries. If we permit individuals to recover damages for defamation, why not permit groups to prove that they (i.e., their members) have suffered injury from hate speech?163

The argument that it is too difficult to draw the line between what is acceptable speech and what is not often fails to countenance the idea that the entire history of law could be described in terms of reasonable line drawing. This has also been true in First Amendment cases, such as those involving false advertising,164 offensive p*rnography,165 state secrets,166 and defamation.167 People who feel they have been grievously hurt by someone else’s words—such as Holocaust survivors whose suffering has been denied168—ought to have a civil remedy. Free speech should not mean speech without cost.169

A tort action for intentional infliction of emotional distress would seem to be an appropriate remedy for racial insults, but courts have generally limited recovery to plaintiffs who suffered some physical injury caused by “extreme and outrageous conduct.”170 In many instances, racial insults would fall short of that standard, particularly if they were simply statements of opinion. Calls to establish another tort—one specifically aimed at combating racial insults—have thus far fallen on deaf ears.171

The few plaintiffs who have been awarded damages for emotional distress caused by hate speech have not been challenged on First Amendment grounds.172 If they had been, however, good counterarguments could be made that such speech does not fall within any of the classic categories of values said to be protected by the Constitution: individual self-fulfillment, truth seeking, securing participation by members of society in social and political decision making, and maintaining a balance between stability and change. Bigotry stifles, rather than enhances, moral and social growth. If truth seeking is to achieve the best decisions on matters of interest to all, most racial insults can be distinguished: a call for genocide can hardly be characterized as the best decision for all. Rather than to allow all members of society to voice their opinions, racial insults contribute to a stratified society. Finally, rather than contribute to a balance between stability and change, racial insults foment discord and violence.173

2.5 The Experience Elsewhere

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination requires the condemnation and criminalization of “all propaganda… based on ideas or theories of superiority… or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form.”174 The European Commission on Human Rights has found such laws to be justifiable limits on the freedom of expression.175

In fact, every Western democracy with the exception of the United States has laws that punish various forms of hate speech, and a number of them specifically prohibit Holocaust denial; the debate elsewhere is not whether to control hate speech but how.

1. Canada

Canada, England, France, and Sweden are most notable among the countries whose values of social liberty are similar to those in the United States. While Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms176 provides a comprehensive guarantee for free speech with language even broader than that of the First Amendment, the country also has a number of other laws that effectively seek to regulate hate speech. A criminal statute prohibits three types of hate propaganda: (a) advocacy of genocide, (b) communications inciting hatred against an identifiable group where a breach of the peace is likely to follow, and (c) public and willful expression of ideas intended to promote hatred against an identifiable group.177

In addition, Canada’s Human Rights Act prohibits use of the telephone to record hate messages.178 The Broadcasting Act authorizes standards for radio and television and prohibits abusive comments likely to expose individuals or groups to contempt on the basis of their race, ethnicity, religion, sex, color, age, or mental or physical disability.179 The Customs Act prohibits importation of hate propaganda.180 Using these laws, Canadian courts have held that hate speech does not belong in any category of expression that deserves constitutional protection. Interestingly, one Canadian court expressly supported that principle by extensive references to American cases, especially Beauharnais v. Illinois.181

Although the most famous test case in Canada was that of Zundel (noted earlier),182 which claimed that the Holocaust was in fact a Zionist swindle, equally pertinent was another challenge to the statute prohibiting Holocaust denial. There, a Canadian high school teacher was charged with violating the Criminal Code for teaching his students that the Holocaust was a hoax, and that Jews were responsible for all the world’s problems; if the students’ exams reflected his view, they received good grades; if not, poor ones. He argued that the law infringed upon his guaranteed right to free expression.183

In upholding the legislation, the Supreme Court of Canada linked the psychological and emotional harm caused by hate propaganda to the target group’s constitutional right of equality. The court found that hate propaganda against particular groups must be prevented if multiculturalism is to be preserved and enhanced; that its “truth value” is marginal; that it denies citizens meaningful participation in the democratic process; and that its contribution to self-fulfillment and human flourishing is negligible.184

2. England

England has sought by statute to restrict racist expression since 1936, when the Public Order Act was passed to combat anti-Semitic fascist demonstrations.185 The act banned the wearing of uniforms during public demonstrations and broadened the state’s power to prohibit a march or demonstration deemed likely to lead to a breach of the peace. The law was periodically strengthened, so that by 1963, the burden was placed on the speaker to prove that his words were not likely to provoke a breach of the peace.186 Subsequent acts prohibited the display of any threatening signs and racial incitement by spoken or written words.187

3. France

In France, more than one famous figure has faced charges for negating crimes against humanity, which there, is deemed a criminal offense. Most recently, the French author Roger Garaudy was cited for denouncing what he called Jewish “Shoah business” and claiming that Israel has exploited the Holocaust to put itself “above all international law.”188

In 1990, Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of France’s right-wing National Front Party, referred to the Nazi gas chambers as “a detail of history.” Outraged survivors joined in a lawsuit against him, and a local court found Le Pen guilty of trivializing the Holocaust and fined him a symbolic one franc. But Le Pen appealed the ruling, claiming his freedom of expression was being denied. A court of appeals not only upheld the decision but increased the fine to 900,000 francs (about $180,000).189

4. Sweden

While Sweden specifically guarantees its citizens a number of liberties (including the freedoms of expression, press, and assembly), its Instrument of Government also sets explicit limits. For example, the Riksdag (Sweden’s governing body) may restrict various freedoms of expression in order to achieve “a purpose which is acceptable in a democratic society.”190 With the same purpose, the Swedish Penal Code prohibits racial defamation.191

5. United States

In the United States—by way of stark contrast from certain European countries—the only jurisprudential remedy against Holocaust denial has been via contract law. In 1980, the aforementioned Institute for Historical Review offered a $50,000 reward for proof that Jews were gassed at Auschwitz. A Holocaust survivor named Mel Mermelstein claimed the reward, submitting as proof declarations by other survivors who witnessed friends and relatives being taken away to their deaths by the Nazis. His own testimony described how he watched his mother and sister led to gas chambers. When the institute told him the offer had been withdrawn because there had been no takers, he sued. The court, finding “the fact that Jews were gassed at Auschwitz is indisputable,” ordered the reward paid.192

3. The Quest for Truth in a Free Society

The devastating truth about the Holocaust is that it was a fact, not a dream. And the devastating truth about the Holocaust deniers is that they will go on using whatever falsehoods they can muster, and taking advantage of whatever vulnerabilities in an audience they can find, to argue, with skill and evil intent, that the Holocaust never happened. By being vigilant to these arguments we can all fight this second murder of the Jews–fight it, and weep not only for the victims’ mortality but also for the fragility, and mortality, of memory.

Sen. Orrin Hatch (1995)193

Without the past, without memory, without history, we are nothing, adrift. We place our destiny and dignity in the hands of the misfits and their projected psychoses. This movement is not an attack on the Holocaust, but on the very notion of historical meaning. It is a revolt against reality, a threat not only to the past but to the future.

James S. Robbins194

Veritas vos liberabit.

(The truth shall make you free.)

3.1 Ignorance and Education

In a free society, it is up to the people to determine the facts of history. Courts and governments should not be arbiters of the truth, even of whether or not a monumental event indeed occurred.195 But trying to prove a crime as monstrous as genocide serves to expose the law’s limits. The capacity of the Nuremberg Tribunal to comprehend Nazi atrocities in conventional terms of criminality was an overwhelming challenge, which may have contributed to an inability to grasp fully the nature and meaning of the Nazis’ effort to exterminate the Jewish population of Europe.196

The argument that the Holocaust is a unique crime whose enormity puts it beyond traditional norms of trial and punishment cannot be easily dismissed. The world of Auschwitz has often been said to lie outside both speech and reason.197 Can that rationale, however, explain why ignorance about the Holocaust is so widespread? A 1992 survey found that 38 percent of American high school students and 28 percent of American adults did not know what the Holocaust was.198 A 2005 poll by the British Broadcasting Corporation found that 60 percent of women and people under 35 years of age had never heard of Auschwitz, the most notorious of all Nazi death camps.199 Even supposedly well-educated people have difficulty identifying historical events related to the Holocaust. Many law students, for example, have never heard of Kristallnacht.200 Law professors, on the other hand, have a special responsibility to educate law students about those who would polarize by preaching doctrines of hatred, which logically and inevitably lead to acts of persecution.201

The environment that enabled the Holocaust to happen has been described as the time “where technology was married to evil.”202 The Internet provides electronic forums called newsgroups—one of which is devoted to revisionist history, which due to its enormous size, is virtually impossible to monitor for hate speech.203

The need to remember the Holocaust is made all the more critical by the existence of well-known political figures who at various times express sympathy for accused Nazi war criminals or doubt the extent of the Holocaust. The most notable current examples in the United States are recent presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan204 and Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan.205

There can be little doubt that Holocaust denial will gain strength once there are no more victims alive to supply eyewitness testimony about Nazi atrocities.206 Meanwhile, though, it has become less and less difficult for Holocaust deniers to find gullible converts among the growing numbers of young people with but a tenuous grasp of basic history. Much can be learned by way of a well-produced video or film, documenting in irrefutable detail the historical record of the Holocaust. Archival footage of the death camps themselves can be juxtaposed with statements by historians, victims, perpetrators, and liberators. Nazi records, Hitler’s recorded speeches, and transcripts from the Wannsee Conference (at which the genocide was carefully planned) should also be made available. This kind of presentation should be unimpeachable and widely distributed, especially to college campuses.207

3.2 Liberty and Responsibility

At the very least, if Holocaust denial is allowed to avoid the limitations we have come to put on obscenity, defamation, state secrets, and other forms of expression not accorded First Amendment protection, certain fundamental principles should be clearly recognized.

Holocaust deniers may self-publish their theories, but they are entitled to no greater access to the general press than anyone else. Their editorial and advertising matter can be constitutionally treated like that of defamers and p*rnographers. Moreover, it can be rejected at will by publishers who choose to do so for arbitrary reasons of ideology, space, financial considerations, or even caprice.

Additionally, there is no need that public libraries carry all books and journals that are available. Indeed, they cannot. Even university research libraries must choose from among the vast amounts of resources procurable. Thus, while accepting material that is patently racist may be important in order to demonstrate that it exists, few serious libraries would similarly carry a complete collection of p*rnography simply to satisfy a scholar’s desire to analyze the difference between p*rnography and erotica. This same rationale should apply when assessing whether libraries should carry racist materials.

In its most-perfect form, speech is exercised freely in an open marketplace of ideas and serves to promote the quest for truth. In its least-perfect form, it suppresses ideas, stifles social discourse, and provokes violence. Thus there is an interdependence between the right to speak and the responsibility to speak honestly. In so doing, the dignity of the target of the speech must be preserved. If the relationship between the right of free speech and the responsibility for free speech is ignored, the traditional justification for protecting it—that it promotes the quest for truth—is denied.208

Holocaust denial is not an attempt at free inquiry but at distortion. Universities are places where students are supposed to think critically; they have no moral responsibility to provide a platform for bigots whose sole purpose is to stir up hatred.209 It is arguable that in the long run, being offended by insensitive language or even outright bigotry might be a small price to pay for the freedom of thought and expression. And there is nothing wrong with reevaluating history; offering new interpretations of old events—in fact, challenging entrenched dogma of all kinds—is central to the academic enterprise. Historians should be allowed to investigate any aspect of the events that have come collectively to be called the Holocaust with the same rigorous and impartial methods they would apply to any other historical event and publish freely the results of their research. “To forbid this is itself a form of denial.”210 But discarding past culture because it is deemed “white” or “patriarchal” or “Eurocentric” can hardly be understood as the honest scholar’s quest for truth. Nor can denying the documented facts of history.

3.3 Toward a More Responsible Press

Various writers, commissions, and task forces have suggested new standards by which the press should be held more accountable. One of the most notable was the Hutchins Commission, which in 1947 published a report entitled A Free and Responsible Press.211 Uncomfortable with the characterization of a free press offered by Charles Beard,212 the commission recommended a number of initiatives, including a truthful comprehensive account of events in a meaningful context, a forum for the exchange of differing opinions, a means of presenting social values, and a way to reach “every member of the society by the currents of information… which the press supplies.” The report warned that the press must become more responsible or face government regulation: “The legal right will stand if the moral right is realized or tolerably approximated.”213

Others have urged adoption of legally enforceable codes of journalistic ethics, greater access to the press by those without realistic expectations of disseminating their views, stronger laws to protect privacy and reputation, and more meaningful restrictions on hate speech and p*rnography. The ultimate goal of a free press should be the presentation and clarification of the goals and values of society.214

A majority of colleges and universities seek to guarantee their student newspapers the same freedom of the press that the Constitution confers upon the private commercial media. Problems arise when student editors and school administrators interpret the First Amendment too broadly, as part of an implicit obligation to foster an open and vigorous marketplace of ideas, which, in turn, should guarantee access by anyone (students or the general public) to editorial and advertising pages.

Such a constitutional perspective is both mistaken and misplaced. Too often overlooked is the simple logic of a free press: while a newspaper has a First Amendment right to publish what it pleases, it also has a First Amendment right to reject what it deems gratuitous or offensive. Such a rejection can be based on content, limited space, or financial considerations.

While philosophers may argue that there are no demonstrably false ideas, and while scientific propositions can never be proven absolutely true, a theory whose predictions fail the test of experimentation can and should be rejected—particularly if its acceptance and application would clearly cause injury.

Unless we are willing to brand nonsense as just that, the notion of truth itself becomes blurred. Both sides of an issue need to be presented only when there are two sides. When verifiable falsehoods become subjects for debate, then nonsense such as Holocaust denial cannot be effectively dismissed, and democratic society is imperiled as much by this as any other single threat, regardless of whether the origins of the nonsense are religious fanaticism, simple ignorance, or personal gain.215

4. Summary and Conclusion

The Holocaust falls into that unique category of criminal malevolence whose enormity puts it beyond the purview of traditional standards of law and reason. Yet, ignorance of its ever having happened is widespread: the tortured cries from the graves of the millions murdered out of madness, unheard. Indeed, as eyewitnesses to survivors of Nazi atrocities themselves pass away, Holocaust denial has gained growing acceptance.

Thus, it is increasingly important that the expression of such thought need not be condoned in a free society. Group libel laws are viable even as civil liberties are fully protected. Tort actions can be pursued for intentional infliction of emotional distress; to that end, American courts should adopt the Canadian view, linking the psychological and emotional harm caused by hate propaganda to the target group’s constitutional right of equality.

Racial hatred may be an inevitable facet of the human condition, but even under the First Amendment, demonstrably false ideas can be prohibited and punished. At the very least, if Holocaust denial is allowed to avoid the limitations we have come to put on obscenity, defamation, disclosure of state secrets, and other forms of expression excluded from First Amendment protection, certain fundamental principles should be clearly recognized. Holocaust deniers are not constitutionally entitled to access someone else’s press. Nor do public libraries need to carry their books and journals.

Holocaust denial should be recognized not as an attempt at free inquiry but as an exercise in distortion. Universities should be regarded as places with the moral responsibility of training students to think critically, not of providing platforms for bigots whose sole purpose is to stir up hatred. Allowing them to discard the documented facts of history can hardly be understood as the honest scholar’s quest for truth.

When perpetrated in an academic environment, Holocaust denial is a particularly pernicious form of hate speech. On American campuses, regardless of whether a student organization is privately or publicly funded, rejection of its right to sponsor a Holocaust denial speaker need not be viewed as suppression of free speech. Nor has freedom of the press been infringed when an advertisem*nt denying the Holocaust is spurned by a student newspaper. Editorial discretion in a free society allows for—indeed, requires—the ability to reject as well as to accept material submitted by outside sources.

Holocaust deniers, often motivated by base anti-Semitic impulses, will always find ways to disseminate their views. Honest scholars have an obligation to confront, challenge, and when necessary, condemn them.

Notes

1.

Earlier analyses of this topic by Professor Lasson appeared in the journals Current Psychology (2007) and the George Mason Law Review (1997).

2.

Eisenhower’s words, written in a letter to Chief of Staff George C. Marshall on April 12, 1945, are etched in stone at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C. Eisenhower went on to say that “[t]he visual evidence and the verbal testimony of starvation, cruelty, and bestial*ty were so overpowering as to leave me a bit sick. In one room, where there were piled up twenty or thirty naked men killed by starvation, George Patton would not even enter. He said he would get sick if he did so.” See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years 2616 (1970).

3.

Sponsored by the Boston College Law School Holocaust/Human Rights Research Project and the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai Brith, the conference took place on April 17, 1986. See Debate, Freedom of Speech and Holocaust Denial, 8 Cardozo L. Rev. 559 (1987).

4.

The museum opened in 1993.

5.

International Conference on Holocaust Opens in Tehran, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, December 11, 2006. Some insisted that Ahmadinejad’s statement was a mistranslation of what he said—but the same quote was on the home page of the Iranian president.

6.

Damian Thompson, Fight Against Arab Holocaust Denial, Telegraph.com, June 26, 2008, available at http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/damian_thompson/blog/2008/06/26/fight_against_arab_holocaust_denial.

7.

Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 2, 130 (1947). Senator Dodd served as the executive counsel to the American prosecutorial team.

8.

Chandler, supra note 2.

9.

Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved 11–12 (Raymond Rosenthal trans., 1989).

10.

Both the New York Times and the New York Herald Tribune published limited reports of the camps as early as 1942. See Walter Laqueur, The Terrible Secret: Suppression of the Truth about Hitler’s “Final Solution” 74, 93 (1980).

11.

Robert H. Abzug, Inside the Vicious Heart: Americans and the Liberation of Nazi Concentration Camps 128 (1985).

12.

See Deborah Lipstadt’s Blog, Obama’s Auschwitz Mistake [2], http://lipstadt.blogspot.com/(last visited Sept. 15, 2009) [hereinafter, Lipstadt, Obama’s Auschwitz Mistake].

13.

French historian Marc Bloch, quoted in James S. Robbins, Adrift in Denial, Nat’l Rev. Online, Dec. 13, 2006, available at http://article.nationalreview.com/300883/adrift-on-denial/james-s-robbins.

14.

Holocaust deniers, on the other hand, argue that the Holocaust did not occur regardless of historical evidence. See Deborah E. Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory 183–208 (1993).

15.

See Rafael Medoff & Alex Grobman, Holocaust Denial: A Global Survey—2006, Wyman Institute for Holocaust Studies, http://www.wymaninstitute.org/articles/HolocaustDenial2006.pdf. [hereinafter, Wyman 2006].

16.

See Rafael Medoff & Alex Grobman, Holocaust Denial: A Global Survey—2007, Wyman Institute for Holocaust Studies, http://www.wymaninstitute.org/articles/HolocaustDenial2007.pdf. [hereinafter, Wyman 2007].

17.

See “British Officials Boycott Oxford Debating Society over Speaking Invitation to Holocaust Denier,” Associated Press, November 20, 2007.

18.

Wyman 2006, supra note 15.

19.

Wyman 2007, supra note 16.

20.

Holocaust denier goes on trial in Germany, Reuters, Nov. 14, 2006, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL1491246520061114.

21.

See Alan Dershowitz, It’s Time for a Holocaust Video, Times-Union, Sept. 4, 1995, at A6.

22.

For a detailed analysis of the use of film as evidence of the Holocaust, see Lawrence Douglas, Film as Witness: Screening Nazi Concentration Camps before the Nuremberg Tribunal, 105 Yale L.J. 449 (1995). The principal film described by Douglas also has been used to prove the falsity of Holocaust denials. see Leonidas E. Hill, The Trial of Ernst Zundel and the Law in Canada, 6 Simon Wiesenthal Center Ann. 165, 184 (1989).

23.

See Greg Beck, Hate War’s New Battleground: The Internet, San Francisco Examiner, June 10, 1996, at A1; see generally Michael Shermer, Proving the Holocaust, 2 Skeptic 32 (1994).

24.

See generally Wyman 2006, supra note 15; Wyman 2007, supra note 16.

25.

Id.

26.

Id.

27.

Wyman 2007, supra note 16.

28.

Id.

29.

See Rafael Medoff, A Holocaust-Denier as Prime Minister of Palestine?, Wyman Institute for Holocaust Studies, Mar. 2003, http://www.wymaninstitute.org/articles/2003-03-denier.php.

30.

Edward I. Koch & Rafael Medoff, What Can Be Done About Holocaust Deniers? Jerusalem Report, Jan. 8, 2007, cited in Edward I. Koch & Rafael Medoff, The Koch Papers: My Fight Against Anti-Semitism 210(2008).

31.

Berenbaum suggests that it would be wise for the West to distinguish between Holocaust denial in the Islamic world and that elsewhere. Michael Berenbaum, Holocaust Denial: Iranian Style, Britannica Blog, Apr. 19, 2007, http://www.britannica.com.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/blogs/2007/04/holocaust-denial-iranian-style/.

32.

Akiva Eldar, Interview with Mahmoud Abbas, Ha’aretz, March 30, 2006.

33.

Jeff Jacoby, Statehood for Palestine? Take A Good Look, Boston Globe, Feb. 14, 2007, at A9, available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/02/14/statehood_for_palestine_take_a_good_look/. See also Rosie Dimanno, No Guarantee This “Map” Leads Anywhere, Toronto Star, May 1, 2003, at A10.

34.

See generally Mark Mazzetti, Some in G.O.P. Say Iran Threat Is Played Down, N.Y. Times, August 24, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/24/washington/24intel.html?pagewanted=print. Later, at a UN conference in Rome, Ahmadinejad said that it would be in the interests of Western Europe if Israel did not exist, and he has blamed the food crisis on Zionists. See Lipstadt, Obama’s Auschwitz Mistake, supra note 12.

35.

Anti-Defamation League, Iran Hosts Anti-Semitic Hatefest in Tehran, Dec. 14, 2006, available at http://www.adl.org/main_International_Affairs/iran_holocaust_conference.htm?Multi_page_sections=sHeading_5. In fact, there were several Arab commentators who condemned the conference. See Middle East Media Research Institute, Criticism of Tehran Holocaust Denial Conference in Arab and Iranian Media Special Dispatch Series—No.1425, Jan. 16, 2007.

36.

Id. at 35. See also Bill Hutchinson, Rabbi Among the Rabble-Rousers, N.Y Daily News, Dec. 13, 2006, at 7.

37.

Id. at 35. See also Katrin Bennhold, Ties Cut With Iran Institute Over Holocaust, N.Y. Times, Sep. 16, 2006, at A9.

38.

James S. Robbins, Adrift on Denial: The Threat from Iran, Nat’l Rev., Dec. 13, 2006 (“[n]ot that speech in Iran is particularly free—I am waiting for the conference that brings together those who deny the divinity of the Koran.”).

39.

See D. D. Guttenplan, Should Freedom of Speech Stop at Holocaust Denial? Index of Free Expression 2005.

40.

Id.

41.

Wyman 2006, supra note 15.

42.

Wyman 2007, supra note 16.

43.

Id.

44.

See Nasser Karimi & Lee Keath, Ahmadinejad: Holocaust Denial A Source of Pride, Huffington Post, Sept. 21, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/09/21/ahmadinejad-holocaust-den_n_293083.html.

45.

Id.

47.

Wyman 2007, supra note 16.

49.

Id.

50.

Id.

51.

Judy Aita, United Nations Condemns Denial of the Holocaust, America.gov, Jan. 26, 2007, available at http://www.america.gov/st/washfileenglish/2007/January/20070126160123eaifas0.887356.html.

52.

Id.

53.

State Department news release, Nov. 4, 2007; Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Anti-Semitism and Racism, Tel Aviv University.

54.

See Kenneth Lasson, Trembling in the Ivory Tower: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure (2003).

55.

The most famous of the modern blood libels is The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, first published in Russia in 1905 and still in widespread circulation today. A detailed account of the book’s evolution is on display at the United States Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C. Three new books on Jewish ritual killings have been published in the past year by Jewish scholars themselves. See Hillel Halkin, Bloody Jews?, Commentary, May 2007, available at http://www.commentarymagazine.com/viewarticle.cfm/bloody-jews—10873?search=1; David Abulafia, The Blood Libel, Then and Now, Times Literary Supp., Mar. 2, 2007.

56.

See generally Kenneth S. Stern, Holocaust Denial (1993).

57.

See Anti- Defamation League Audit of Anti-Semitic Incidents 1995, U.S. Newswire, Feb. 28, 1996, available at LEXIS, USNWR File [hereinafter ADL Audit].

58.

See Bob Keeler, Assault on History, Newsday, Feb. 24, 1994, at 68. See generally Lipstadt, supra note 14, at 183–208.

59.

See Jeff Ristine, Ad Questioning Holocaust Takes Aim at Students, San Diego Union-Tribune, Jan. 11, 1992, at A1. See also Lipstadt, supra note 14, at 183–208; see Leon Jeroff, Debating the Holocaust, Time, Dec. 27, 1993, at 83.

60.

see Lipstadt, supra note 14, at 183–208. Some campus papers published the advertisem*nts on free speech grounds, while others refused to do so. Apparently in response to Smith’s campaign, classes on the Holocaust have been increasing. Id.

61.

see Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Time Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133, 135 (9th Cir. 1971).

62.

A self-described “historical revisionist society,” the Institute for Historical Review supports the idea that the Holocaust was a distortion of history. see Encyclopedia of Associations 1, 9 (Sandra Joszczak ed., 31st ed. 1996); see also Lipstadt, supra note 14, at 105; Geri J. Yonover, Anti-Semitism and Holocaust Denial in the Academy: A Tort Remedy, 101 Dick. L. Rev. 71, 76 n. 30 (1996).

63.

see Doreen Carvajal, Extremist Institute Mired in Power Struggle, L.A. Times, May 15, 1994, at A3, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1994-05-15/news/mn-57997_1_staff-member. Carto had already organized the Liberty Lobby, a Washington-based group considered to be one of the most active anti-Semitic organizations in the country. Id.

64.

See Lipstadt, supra note 14, at 185; ADL Report Reveals Split in Holocaust Denial Movement that is as Hateful as Their Anti-Semitic Propaganda, Business Wire, available at LEXIS; National Brief, Houston Chron., Jan. 25, 1992, at A12, available at http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl/1992_1032765/national-briefs.html.

65.

Arthur Butz, The Hoax of the Twentieth Century (1976). Noontide Press and the Institute for Historical Review are closely related. see Lipstadt, supra note 14, at 152–53; see also Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 838 F.2d 1287, 1296 (Bork, J.) (D.C. Cir. 1988) (describing the relationship as the “Liberty Lobby/Legion/Noontide/IHR network”). In 2006, Butz, a tenured professor of electrical engineering at Northwestern, wrote a column in the campus newspaper expressing support for the Holocaust denial activities of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. see Jodi S. Cohen, NU Rips Holocaust Denial, President Calls Prof an Embarrassment but Plans No Penalty, Chicago Trib., Feb. 7, 2006.

66.

Paul Rassinier, Debunking the Genocide Myth (1978); see also Lipstadt, supra note 14, at 51–64.

67.

see Donna Prokop, Note, Controversial Teacher Speech: Striking A Balance Between First Amendment Rights and Educational Interests, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2534, 2564 (1993). see also Lipstadt, supra note 14, at 123–36, 51–65.

68.

see Jenish D’Arcy & William Lowther, War of Words: Academics Clash Over “Correctness,” MacLean’s, May 27, 1991, at 44.

69.

Deborah Lipstadt, False “Reasoning” on the Holocaust, Newsday, July 23, 1993, at 61.

70.

Poll Shows Israeli-Arab Holocaust Denial, Support for Hizbullah, Israel Faxx, Mar. 19, 2007; Holocaust Denial, Israel Faxx, Mar. 30, 2007.

71.

see Robert Hawkins, Some Imprints Left as 1991 FadesArt-Censorship Battles Loom as Pressure Increasing From All Viewpoints, San Diego Union-Tribune, Dec. 27, 1991, at C1.

72.

See generally Kenneth Lasson, Political Correctness Askew: Excesses in the Pursuit of Minds and Manners, 63 Tenn. L. Rev. 689 (1996). The pernicious nature of political correctness is most clearly revealed by the absurd extremes encouraged by some campus conduct codes. Though many of them have never been tested in court and continue to be broadly implemented—some to the destruction of careers and reputations—not one of them to date has been found constitutional. see Kenneth Lasson, Trembling in the Ivory Tower (Bancroft Press, 2003).

73.

see Stephen Reese & John D.H. Downing, Holocaust Ad Poisons Public Debate, Austin-American Statesman, May 1, 1992, at 1.

74.

The rules regarding harassment have iced over into the first icy patch on the slippery slope to repression of unpopular ideas. They deter not only genuine misconduct but also harmless (and even desirable) speech, which in higher education is central both to the purpose of the institution and to the employee’s profession and performance. Legislative remedies should not be necessary, but they are. In 1993, California saw fit to enact a new law guaranteeing “students… the same right to exercise their free speech on campus as they enjoy when off campus.” Cal. [Schools and School Districts] Code § 4(b) (West 1997). The clear line to be drawn between academic freedom and actionable harassment is the same as that between speech and conduct. The former is almost always protected by the First Amendment; the latter can be constitutionally proscribed.

75.

See ADL Quotes Farrakhan One Year After Million-Man March, U.S. Newswire, Oct. 9, 1996; Richard Cohen, Why the Silence on Farrakhan, Wash. Post, July 26, 1985, at A25; The Farrakhan Show, Wash. Post, Aug. 1, 1984, available at 1984 WL 2024765; Garry Wills, Perot’s Anti-Semitic Company, Times-Union, Aug. 15, 1996, at A15.

76.

see Ken Ringle, Of History and Politics: A Classicist at War, Int’l Herald Trib., June 12, 1996; Text of ADL Report on Writings of Professor Tony Martin, U.S. Newswire, Oct. 12, 1995; see also Selwyn R. Cudjoe, Academic Responsibility and Black Scholars, Baltimore Sun, Mar. 23, 1994, at 19A.

77.

see Nat Hentoff, The Return of Khalid Muhammad: “Hitler Used the Same Words About Jews,” The Village Voice, Nov. 26, 1996, at 10 (quoting Jesse Jackson’s characterization of Khalid Muhammad’s Kean College speech as “racist, anti-Semitic, divisive, untrue, and chilling”); Stephen A. Holmes, Farrakhan Is Warned Over Aide’s Invective, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1994, at A12; Jon Nordheimer, Divided by a Diatribe: College Speech Ignites Furor Over Race, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1993, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/29/nyregion/divided-by-a-diatribe-college-speech-ignites-furor-over-race.html?pagewanted=1; Steven Lubet, That’s Funny, You Don’t Look Like You Control the Government: The Sixth Circuit’s Narrative on Jewish Power, 45 Hastings L.J. 1527, 1527–28 (1994); Speech: “The Secret Relationship Between Blacks and Jews,” N.J. L.J., Jan. 24, 1994, at 17 (entire text of Khalid Muhammad’s Kean College speech).

78.

see ADL Audit, supra note 57; Joseph Berger, College Chief Calls Jeffries “Racist,” But Defends Keeping Him, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1991, at B1; Prokop, supra note 67, at 2536; Jacques Steinberg, CUNY Professor Criticizes Jews, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1991, at B3; Wills, supra note 75. see also Yonover, supra note 62, at 83 n. 75.

79.

See, e.g., Michael W. Sasser, Speakers Find Cozy Home at Universities, Palm Beach Jewish J., July 23, 1996, at 1.

80.

Some teachers have dropped references to the Holocaust studies altogether, so as to avoid offending children of certain races or religions. see Alexandra Frean, Schools Drop Holocaust Lessons To Avoid Offence, The Times (London), April 2, 2007, at 8, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/education/article1600686.ece. see also Abraham Cooper & Harold Brackman, You Can’t Teach History Without The Holocaust, Globe & Mail (Canada), Apr. 16, 2007, at A13.

81.

Benjamin Franklin, Federal Gazette (Phil.), Sept. 12, 1789, at 2.

82.

See e.g., Jeffrey A. Smith, Prior Restraint: Original Intentions and Modern Interpretations, 28 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 439, 457–58 (1987).

83.

“Congress shall make no law… abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. Const. Amend. I.

84.

Adlai E. Stevenson, The One-Party Press, in The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson 75, 78 vol. 4 (Walter Johnson ed., vol.4, 1974) (“The free press is the mother of all our liberties and of our progress under liberty.”). see also Junius, Dedication to the English Nation (1772), in The Letters of Junius 7, 8 –9 (John Cannon ed., 1978) (“Let it be impressed upon your minds, let it be instilled into your children, that the liberty of the press is the palladium of all the civil, political, and religious rights….”); Edmund Randolph, Essay on the Revolutionary History of Virginia, reprinted in 44 VA. Mag. of Hist. & Biography 43, 46 (1936) (stating that freedom of the press was one of “the fruits of genuine democracy and historical experience[.]”).

85.

Charles Beard, St. Louis Post-Dispatch Symposium on Freedom of the Press 13 (1938) quoted in Commission on Freedom of the Press, A Free and Responsible Press 131 (1947).

86.

The ideas expressed in this section were originally presented in Kenneth Lasson, Group Libel Versus Free Speech: When Big Brother Should Butt In, 23 Duquesne L. Rev. 77, 97–101 (1984).

87.

See, e.g., William O. Douglas, An Almanac of Liberty 362 (1954) and David N. Mayer, The Constitutional Thought of Thomas Jefferson 166–84 (1994).

88.

Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson 297, 300 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds.,1993).

89.

see Douglas, supra note 87, at 362. Justice Douglas naturally interpreted Jefferson’s meaning as in accord with his own absolutist stance. But the argument made by the state in favor of any given abridgment of speech is always that social peace and security is being threatened.

90.

John Finnis, “Reason and Passion”: The Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and Obscenity, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 222, 229 (1967). see also David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 455 (1983).

91.

The stirring up of racial or ethnic “fears, hate, guilt and greed” is fundamentally opposed to the Framer’s intent to ensure cooperative social pluralism. Derrick A. Bell, Race, Racism and American Law 59 (1973).

92.

The positive intent of the Framers to found a nation based on pluralism should not, therefore, be distorted to tolerate the free rein of vindictive attack, which is unrelated, except in appearance, to any constitutional or national purpose. See, e.g., Benjamin R. Epstein & Arnold Forster, The Radical Right 40 (1967); Brendan F. Brown, Racialism and the Rights of Nations, 21 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 13 (1945). Note also that invidious racial and ethnic discrimination has been rejected as antithetical to American national policy. see Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).

93.

see James Macgregor Burns, The Vineyard of Liberty 60–62 (1982); Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 299 (1978); Franklyn S. Haiman, How Much of Our Speech Is Free?, 2 Civ. Lib. Rev. 111, 113 (1975).

94.

Burns, supra note 93, at 62, 539–40.

95.

Jefferson supra note 88, at 403, 405 (quoting from a letter to James Madison, Dec. 20, 1787, “a bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth, general or particular”).

96.

Burns, supra note 93, at 542–43; see also Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245, 264.

97.

see Meiklejohn, supra note 96, at 255. To Meiklejohn, the goal appears to be the acquisition by voters of “intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general welfare”—a weighty purpose indeed for speech to play.

98.

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973); see also Finnis, supra note 90, at 238.

99.

Burns, supra note 93, at 60–61.

100.

Id.

101.

see Peter Ustinov, My Russia 204, 209 (1983).

102.

The free speech guarantee is thus a means to the end, not the end in itself. see Frederick F. Schauer, The Law of Obscenity (1976) (claiming that “free speech is seen as an instrument of good, not as a good in itself”). see also Burns, supra note 93, at 62 (“[t]he issue that would become the grandest question of them all—the extent to which government should interfere with some persons’ liberties in order to grant them and other persons more liberty and equality—this issue lay beyond the intellectual horizons”).

103.

For example, the Supreme Court’s willingness to protect the wearing of a jacket with offensive words lettered on it or black armbands in school can be explained by the political nature of resistance to the unpopular war in Vietnam. see Schauer, supra note 102, at 13–14.

104.

The motivation behind particular protected speech as a basis for regulation cannot be questioned. Cf. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961) (holding that protected speech aimed at elimination of competition did not violate antitrust laws); Henrico Prof. Firefighters Assoc. v. Board of Supervisors, 649 F.2d 237, 245 n.12 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that a speaker’s motivation is irrelevant to First Amendment analysis). Any analysis of a speaker’s motivation would necessarily scrutinize both the sincerity of his belief in certain ideas and his reasons for expressing them. see Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 64–66 (1975); Finnis, supra note 90, at 222–23.

105.

Annals of Congress, Vol. 1, 731–32 (Joseph Gales etal. eds., 1790), reprinted in Bernard Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 1029 (Chelsea House Publishers 1971).

106.

Jefferson, supra note 88, 428, 429 (quoting from a letter to Col. David Humphreys, Mar. 18, 1789).

107.

Mayer, supra note 87, at 169.

108.

Id. at 171 (quoting from a letter to James Madison, Aug. 28, 1789).

109.

see David S. Bogen, The Origins of Freedom of Speech and Press, 42 Md. L. Rev. 429 (1983).

110.

Congress has recognized the unfairness of broadcast monopolies, which are regulated by the Federal Communications Commission and subjected to various egalitarian measures such as equal-time requirements in political campaigns.

111.

see Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 54–55 (2d Cir. 1996); Sinn v. Daily Nebraskan, 829 F.2d 662, 664 (8th Cir. 1987).

112.

see Miriam Colton, Leading Liberal Mag Yanks Ad Denying Holocaust, Forward, April 30, 2004, available at http://www.forward.com/articles/5558/.

113.

Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 n.18 (1945)).

114.

see Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 144–57 (1951) (holding that publisher’s policy of refusing to accept advertising from companies, which also placed ads with publisher’s competitors. constituted a Sherman Act violation); see also Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1957).

115.

Poughkeepsie Buying Serv., Inc. v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc., 131 N.Y.S.2d 515, 517 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954). This position appears to be uniform among the states with one exception. In Uhlman v. Sherman, 22 Ohio N.P. (new series) 225 (1919), the court reasoned that the newspaper business was clothed with public interest and that a newspaper was in the class of a quasi-public corporation bound to treat all advertisers fairly and without discrimination. Courts in other states have expressly rejected Uhlman. See, e.g., In re Louis Wohl, Inc., 50 F.2d 254, 256 (E.D. Mich. 1931); Shuck v. Carroll Daily Herald, 215 Iowa 1276, 247 N.W. 813 (1933); Friedenberg v. Times Publ’g Co., 127 So. 345 (La. 1930). see also Zachary Berman, Say What You Will: Not in My Newspaper, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1992, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/18/opinion/l-say-what-you-will-not-in-my-newspaper-271392.html?pagewanted=1.

116.

see Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).

117.

see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).

118.

see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

119.

see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

120.

Newspapers may be punished for publishing material that offends contemporary community standards. see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).

121.

see New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. at 713.

122.

see Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).

123.

Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 254.

124.

See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 23 (1973) (defining obscenity as sexually explicit matter offensive to “contemporary community standards”); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).

125.

see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372–80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

126.

Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375–76.

127.

see Lasson, supra note 86, at 78.

128.

There is some doubt that Voltaire actually made this statement, although it is indicative of an attitude attributed to him. see Burton Stevenson, The Home Book of Quotations 726, 2776 (10th ed., 1967) and S.G. Tallentyre, The Friends of Voltaire 199 (1907).

129.

see International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1950), aff’d, 341 U.S. 694 (1951).

130.

Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 854, 882 (1963). Professor Emerson’s seminal article suggested three other First-Amendment values besides truth seeking: individual self-fulfillment; securing participation by members of society in political decision making; and maintaining a balance between stability and change.

131.

Lee C. Bolinger, The Tolerant Society: Freedom of Speech and Extremist Speech in America (1986).

132.

Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: A Response to Critics, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 979, 986–88 (1990).

133.

See, e.g., Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation 1–14 (1961).

134.

see Debate, supra note 3, at 588 (statement by Alan Dershowitz).

135.

see Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 Geo. L.J. 453, 483–84 (1996). But see infra note 197 and accompanying text (suggesting the Holocaust is a crime that lies outside both speech and reason).

136.

For a list of those countries, see infra notes 176–191 and accompanying text.

137.

At first, several Armenian groups sought to have Professor Lewis prosecuted under France’s criminal Holocaust denial law, but a court ruled that the statute applied only to the Nazi regime of terror. The groups were more successful before a subsequent civil tribunal, which found Lewis guilty and fined him $2,000 (while declining to rule on whether his opinion as expressed was right or wrong). seeHate Speech” Again, Abroad, Wash. Post, Sept. 9, 1995, at A16 (“[w]hen a court is willing to punish a scholar—or anyone, for that matter, for expressing an “insulting” opinion on a historical matter, even when debate on the point in question has been raging worldwide for years, the absurdity and perniciousness of such laws is on full display”).

138.

see Eric Stein, History Against Free Speech: The New German Law Against the “Auschwitz”—and Other—“Lies,” 85 Mich. L. Rev. 277, 280 nn. 9–11 (1986) (translating Art. 194 StGB). Germany also recently used its presidency of the European Union to replicate its strict laws prohibiting Holocaust denial. see David Charter, EU Declares Trivializing Genocide A Crime, NSW County Edition, April 21, 2007, at 14.

139.

See Letter from Herbert A. Strauss to Eric Stein in Correspondence, On the “Auschwitz Lie,” 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1026, 1031 (1989).

140.

Id. at 1030.

141.

see Stein, supra note 139, at 315.

142.

see Rekha Basu, Banned Books Given Spotlight, Des Moines Reg., Sept. 29, 1995, at 1; Alison Leigh Cowan, A Library’s Approach to Books That Offend, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 2009, available at http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/19/a-librarys-approach-to-books-that-offend/.

143.

For example, in Queens, N.Y., a book about Martin Luther King was opposed by a school board member who viewed him as a “leftist hoodlum with significant Communist ties.” Id. at 1.

144.

see Carol Berger, Hate Book Sparks Debate of Freedom, Edmonton J., Jan. 24, 1995, at A7.

145.

For a recent learned article arguing why democratic principles of free speech should trump laws that prohibit Holocaust denial, see Peter R. Teachout, Making Holocaust Denial a Crime: Reflections on European Anti-Negationist Laws from the Perspective of U. S. Constitutional Experience, 30 Vt. L. Rev. 655 (2007).

146.

Justices Hugo Black and William O. Douglas generally took the First Amendment literally to mean that Congress could make no law abridging free speech “without any ‘ifs’ or ‘buts’ or ‘whereases.’ ” Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting); see also Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 156 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[t]he First Amendment is written in terms that are absolute…. The ban of “no” law that abridges freedom of the press is in my view total and absolute.”).

147.

Lasson, supra note 86, at 79.

148.

For a comprehensive discussion, see Rodney A. Smolla, Smolla & Nimmer on Freedom of Speech 10, 32–34 (3d ed. 1996).

149.

See generally Kenneth Lasson, Racial Defamation as Free Speech: Abusing the First Amendment, 17 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 11, 20–30 (1985).

150.

See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).

151.

See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919).

152.

See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).

153.

see Mayer, supra note 87, at 171–72 (discussing Jefferson’s views on the liability of publishers for false facts printed, despite freedom of the press and criminal acts dictated by religious error as punishable despite guarantee of free exercise of religion); see generally Lasson, supra note 149, at 97.

154.

Frederick Schauer, The First Amendment as Ideology, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 853, 854 (1992).

155.

See generally Leonard Levy, Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History (1960); and Schauer, supra note 154.

156.

See generally Schauer, supra note 154.

157.

Bollinger, supra note 132, at 995. In Germany, for example, as long as the Holocaust remains part of recent memory, it will be difficult not to punish the expression of Nazi ideology. Id. at 990.

158.

Schauer, supra note 154, at 867.

159.

Debate, supra note 3, at 571, 582–83.

160.

see Kathleen E. Mahoney, Hate Speech: Affirmation or Contradiction of Freedom of Expression, 96 U. Ill. L. Rev. 789, 792 (1996).

161.

See generally Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 133 (1982); Mari M. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320 (1989).

162.

see Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice 14–15 (1954).

163.

see Lasson, supra note 149, at 108–28.

164.

See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).

165.

See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).

166.

See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

167.

See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

168.

see Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 373 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. 1978) (allowing neo-Nazis to march through residential area largely inhabited by Holocaust survivors).

169.

see Debate, supra note 3, at 576 (quoting Arthur Berney).

170.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965). see also Stephen Fleischer, Campus Speech Codes: The Threat to Liberal Education, 27 J. Marshall L. Rev. 709, 724–25 (1994). But see Geri J. Yanover, Anti-Semitism and Holocaust Denial in the Academy: A Tort Remedy, 101 Dick. L. Rev. 71 (1996) (arguing strongly for the viability of intentional infliction of emotional distress as a remedy for Holocaust denial).

171.

see Delgado, supra note 161, at 252. Professor Delgado notes, however, that although his call for establishment of a tort for racial insults has not been heeded, over the years since his article first appeared, a number of courts have recognized various causes of action to redress racist slurs. Telephone conversation with Richard Delgado, professor of law, UCLA Law School (Sept. 11, 1996).

172.

see Delgado, supra note 161, at 172; see also Wiggs v. Courshon, 355 F. Supp. 206 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Agarwal v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1979); Alcorn v. Anbro Eng’g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1970); Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach, Corp., 565 P.2d 1173 (Wash. 1977).

173.

see Emerson, supra note 130, at 879–86. This function of the First Amendment has been viewed by some as limited to political ideas. see Delgado, supra note 161, at 175–79; see generally Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom (1960).

174.

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 194, 3 I.L.M. 164, 166–67.

175.

see Stephen J. Roth, The Legal Fight Against Anti-Semitism: Survey of Developments in 1993 at 23–26. (1995)

176.

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1 S.C. V (1982).

177.

Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, 319 (1985) (Can.).

178.

Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C., ch. H-6 (1985) (Can.).

179.

Broadcasting Act, R.S.C., ch. B-9, 3 (1985) (Can.).

180.

Customs Act, R.S.C., ch. 1, 181 (1985) (Can.).

181.

Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (holding that defamation of groups may be treated the same way as libel of individuals); see R. v. Keegstra [1990] S.C.R. 697, 707, 739–41 (“[c]redible arguments have been made that later Supreme Court cases do not necessarily erode [Beauharnais’] legitimacy” (See, e.g., Lasson, supra note 149)).

182.

R. v. Zundel [1987] 7 W.C.B.2d 26, aff’d, [1990] 9 W.C.B.2d 238, rev’d, [1992] 17 W.C.B.2d 106. See supra notes 21ff. and accompanying text.

183.

see R. v. Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.

184.

Id. at 744–68. see also Canadian Human Rights Comm’n v. Taylor [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892 (denying protection to a group prosecuted for operating a telephone service that played prerecorded messages denigrating Jews); R. v. Andrews [1990] 3 S.C.R. 870 (refusing to extend constitutional protection to leaders of a white supremacist group for publishing an anti-Semitic newspaper that stated the Holocaust was a Zionist hoax). A Canadian group also proposed that Ahmadinejad be indicted for advocacy of genocide. see Irwin Cotler, Speech to Target Iran for Genocidal Policy, CTV Television, Inc., Jan. 23, 2007.

185.

Public Order Act, 1936, 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, ch. 6 (Eng.).

186.

Public Order Act, 1963, ch. 52 (Eng.).

187.

Race Relations Act, 1965, ch. 73 (Eng.); see generally Kenneth Lasson, Racism in Great Britain: Drawing the Line on Free Speech, 7 B. C. Third World L.J. 161 (1987).

188.

see Reports from the Cordoba OSCE Conference on Anti-Semitism and Other Forms of Intolerance, Internet Centre Anti-Racism Europe (ICARE), June 8–9, 2005, available at http://www.icare.to/cordoba/uk/.

189.

See Comeuppance for a Bigot, Time, Apr. 1, 1991, at 50. It was not until 1995 that France publicly admitted responsibility for deporting almost 70,000 Jews to Nazi death camps—only 2,800 of whom returned. see Gail Russell Chaddock, Cleric’s Comments Ignite the Fury of French Media, Christian Sci. Monitor, July 25, 1996, at 5.

190.

IG 2:12–2:14.

191.

Penal Code ch. 16, 8 (1972).

192.

Mermelstein v. Institute for Historical Review, No. C356 542 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 22, 1985). The case was settled when the institute agreed to pay the $50,000 plus $100,000 for Mermelstein’s pain and suffering caused by the revoked offer. Id. See also Lawsuit Over Proof of Holocaust Ends with Payment to a Survivor, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1985, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1985/07/25/us/lawsuit-over-proof-of-holocaust-ends-with-payment-to-a-survivor.html.

193.

141 Cong. Rec. S16853 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (quoting Dr. Walter Reich, executive director, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum).

194.

Robbins, supra note 38.

195.

As Justice Felix Frankfurter put it, “Courts ought not to enter this political thicket.” Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). Even more to the point is Alan Dershowitz: “I am categorically opposed to any court, any school board, any governmental agent taking judicial notice about any historical event, even one that I know to the absolute core of my being occurred, like the Holocaust. I don’t want the government to tell me that it occurred because I don’t want any government ever to tell me that it didn’t occur.” Debate (above n. 3) 566.

196.

see Douglas, supra note 87, at 453. Douglas also notes that by translating evidence of unprecedented atrocity into crimes of war, the Nuremberg prosecution was able to create a coherent and judicially manageable narrative of criminality that seemed to defy rational and juridical explanation. Id. at 454.

197.

see George Steiner, Language and Silence 118, 123 (1967). If Auschwitz is unique, denying other violent and arbitrary dominance should be outside the purview of punishment.

198.

The 1992 Holocaust poll was by Roper. see Jeroff, supra note 59. A poll by the same company in 2000 found that as many as 8 percent of Americans may be deniers. Michael Berenbaum, The Growing Assault on the Truth of Absolute Evil, L.A. Times, Jan. 28, 2000, at B7, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2000/jan/28/local/me-58733.

199.

David McLoughlin, Understanding the Holocaust, Dominion Post (Wellington, New Zealand), April 16, 2005, at 13. see also Alan Crawford, Look to Germany to Learn Lessons of Holocaust, Sunday Herald, Jan. 23, 2005, at 11.

200.

“The Night of Broken Glass,” Nov. 9, 1938, called by many the beginning of the Holocaust. see 141 Cong. Rec. S16853 (Nov. 9, 1995). Every year, the author asks his civil liberties students (all of whom are upperclassmen) if they have ever heard of Kristallnacht. Few answer in the affirmative.

201.

This responsibility was recognized at the 2007 Silberman Seminar for Law Faculty, The Impact and Legacy of the Holocaust on the Law, sponsored by the Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, June 4–15, 2007, in Washington, D.C. see also Bruce Levine, An Education in Law—For What Purpose?, 34 Washburn L.J. 516 (1995).

202.

Robert Trussell, Couple Brings Reality of Holocaust Home to Younger Viewers with “Anne Frank,” Kansas City Star, Mar. 15, 1996, at Preview 18 (quoting Mark Weitzman of the Simon Wiesenthal Center).

203.

Recent patrons have included Bradley Smith’s Holocaust-denying Institute for Historical Review. “The Holocaust story,” says Smith, “is closed to free inquiry in our universities and among intellectuals. The Internet represents a huge potential audience at minimal cost.” Beck, supra note 23, at A1. see also Allison Sommer, Free Speech Advocates and Opponents Move Their Battle to the Net, Jerusalem Post, Feb. 9, 1996, at 7.

204.

see Lipstadt, supra note 14, at 5–6; David A. Nacht, Book Note, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1802, 1808 (1992) (reviewing Alan Dershowitz, Chutzpah); William F. Buckley, Jr., In Search of Anti-Semitism, Nat’l Rev., Dec. 30, 1991, at 20.

205.

In France, the highly respected cleric Abbé Pierre lent credence to author Roger Garaudy’s book, The Founding Myths of Israeli Politics, which sought to trivialize the Holocaust.

206.

see Judith Miller, Erasing the Past: Europe’s Amnesia About the Holocaust, N.Y. Times Mag., Nov. 16, 1986, § 6, at 30.

207.

see Dershowitz, supra note 21, at A6.

208.

see generally Leon E. Trakman, Transforming Free Speech: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 899 (1995).

209.

see Miller, supra note 206, at 30.

210.

Peter Simple, Denial, London Daily Telegraph, Apr. 12, 1996 at A1.

211.

The Commission on Freedom of the Press, A Free and Responsible Press (Robert D. Leigh ed., 1947). The Commission on Freedom of the Press was chaired by Robert Maynard Hutchins.

212.

see above note 83 and accompanying text.

213.

A Free and Responsible Press, supra note 85, at 1, 20–21, 131.

214.

Smolla, supra note 148, at 184.

215.

Lawrence Krauss, Opinion, Equal Time for Nonsense, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1996, at A19. Krauss is chairman of the physics department at Case Western Reserve University. He goes on to cite favorably the advice passed on by Arthur Hays Sulzberger (publisher of the New York Times from 1935–1961): “I believe in an open mind, but not so open that your brains fall out.”

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